To what extent can the imprisonment of Nicolás Maduro be interpreted as a breach of the principle of sovereignty, or, on the contrary, as the consequence of his previous weakening? Could the new Venezuelan government invest in the oil sector to stimulate economic growth? To address this problem comprehensively, we interviewed three professionals from different fields, whose complementary views enable examination of the event’s political, legal, and economic impacts.
On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in Caracas during a military operation that took the international community by surprise. According to the argument presented by the United States, Maduro is held responsible for crimes related to narco-terrorism, conspiracy to smuggle drugs into the United States, and weapons possession. This action has been described by U.S. leaders as part of a broader strategy to combat international drug trafficking. After the charges against him were read, Nicolás Maduro described himself as a prisoner of war, despite the fact that during his presidency Venezuela experienced the exodus of eight million people, more than 18,000 political detentions, a sharply reduced economy, sustained hyperinflation, and deep structural poverty.
It is worth noting that the prosecutorial indictment was later modified, and this new version no longer mentions the Cartel of the Suns, according to the United States. Instead, the focus is placed on military officials involved in drug trafficking, while the media continue to use that designation. In this context, the U.S. intervention and the capture of Nicolás Maduro highlight that the international order is not only in crisis but deeply collapsed. The absence of an international legal framework authorizing military intervention and the prosecution of a sitting head of state in domestic courts, combined with the lack of defense of Venezuelan sovereignty by China, Russia, and the European Union, demonstrates the loss of real weight of the multilateral system.
Felipe Torres Gianvittorio, a Venezuelan journalist and editor of LatAm Explained, analyzes how the Chavista regime has been operating following the inauguration of Delcy Rodríguez as Maduro’s replacement. For years—dating back even to Hugo Chávez’s presidency—there has been a clearly defined, widespread fear within civil society. The central question has always been whether the regime’s response to internal or external aggression would be repression directed at the population itself. According to the Venezuelan Program for Education-Action on Human Rights, at least 215 people died during anti-government protests in 2014, 2017, and 2019, and following the fraud of the 2024 elections, the largest wave of repression in the country’s history was unleashed.
Domestic politics and public opinion
After Maduro’s detention, the transitional government led by Delcy Rodríguez intensified repression. Armed groups and police carried out street checks, and a decree ordered the prosecution of anyone who supported the military intervention.
Political scientist Noel Oviedo Garbiso argues that the government’s discourse is aimed primarily at internal regime actors—political factions, the armed forces, and economic sectors—and serves to sustain the apparatus of control and repression inherited from Chavismo, through an anti-imperialist rhetoric that coexists with a pragmatic opening toward the United States. He notes that despite gestures such as the announcement of political prisoners’ release, repressive practices such as checkpoints, searches, and surveillance persist, revealing a contradiction between discourse and reality.
The central social debate revolves around whether all legal avenues had been exhausted before resorting to a military operation. Noel argues that the performance of international organizations in Latin America in response to the Venezuelan crisis was largely deficient. He considers the OAS to be deeply delegitimized, not only because of its limited practical usefulness but also because it failed to produce meaningful political change, exposing its structural limitations as a regional organization.
Regarding the United Nations, he also views its role as limited: he highlights the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, particularly during Michelle Bachelet’s period, in collecting testimonies of political persecution and repression, but emphasizes that this contribution was largely testimonial and had no concrete consequences. From the standpoint of Venezuelan public opinion, this reinforced the perception of the irrelevance of international organizations—something that, according to Noel, they must reverse if they hope to regain legitimacy.
In recent weeks, the release of political prisoners has become the central topic of Venezuela’s domestic politics and is seen as the main thermometer for measuring the democratic will of the transitional government led by Delcy Rodríguez. Noel argues that this is the most urgent and dramatic issue of the process, with a strong humanitarian and cross-cutting component that allows for less polarized frameworks of discussion than strictly political debates. Regional actors such as Brazil, under Lula da Silva, have already positioned themselves in favor of releasing political prisoners without endorsing the U.S. military intervention.
In parallel, Noel identifies that narratives about what occurred are already in dispute: one that defends Maduro’s legacy and condemns the intervention; another, supported by governments such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, that questions both Maduro and the legitimacy of the U.S. action; and a third that celebrates the overthrow as a positive development. He notes that recent polls show that a majority of Venezuelans view the intervention favorably, introducing an additional tension into the debate over legitimacy and sovereignty.
Also, Noel argues that the intervention in Venezuela may have reconfigured alliance dynamics in Latin America. However, the anti-imperialist bloc of the early 2000s was already weakened. He notes that progressive governments such as those of Lula da Silva, Gabriel Boric, and Xiomara Castro adopted more cautious stances toward Venezuela, avoiding explicit alliances due to the growing authoritarianism of Chavismo and the domestic political cost of defending it. According to Noel, the region is moving toward greater pragmatic alignment with the United States, driven both by the global rise of the right and by economic and political survival needs.
Nevertheless, following U.S. actions, concern has emerged among Latin American countries, structured around two central axes: on the one hand, regional alarm at a United States willing to intervene militarily in Latin America; on the other, domestic pressure generated by the Venezuelan migration crisis, especially in countries such as Chile, Peru, and Colombia, where the phenomenon was politicized and—erroneously—linked to crime, fueling xenophobic narratives.
Regarding Venezuela’s internal politics, Noel observes deep political exhaustion. He argues that the legitimacy of the traditional opposition is very low, with the exception of María Corina Machado. Figures such as Juan Guaidó and Leopoldo López raised expectations that were not fulfilled, leading to social demobilization and collective frustration. Although the intervention revived hopes for change, there is also strong caution regarding the possibility that the change may be superficial. He stresses that Venezuela remains an unlivable country despite Maduro’s removal.
He describes the prevailing sentiment among the Venezuelan population and the diaspora as a mix of relief, hope, and caution. He acknowledges that Maduro’s capture reignited expectations of democratic opening, but warns that the continuity of Chavista figures and the central role of the United States generate distrust regarding the true depth of change.
From a communications standpoint, Noel highlights that the United States adopted a direct and explicit narrative to justify the intervention in terms of security and strategic resources, which he views as consistent with its historical tradition. In contrast, he describes the Venezuelan transitional government as caught between the need to preserve its anti-U.S. ideological legitimacy and its effective dependence on Washington’s support.
International law, sovereignty, and geopolitics
Research professor Franklin Molina from Venezuela, argues that the capture of a sitting head of state constitutes an event of enormous impact on the international and regional political system, comparable to exceptional cases such as the capture of Saddam Hussein or, in Latin America, the arrest of Manuel Noriega in 1989. He asserts that in the Venezuelan case, the impact is even greater due to the nature of Nicolás Maduro’s leadership and the context in which the operation took place, clearly outside existing international law.
Regarding whether this event could set a precedent for future political conflicts, Molina warns that the main risk is the progressive erosion of state sovereignty. He argues that responses to democratic deficits should not be external intervention, but rather stronger regional integration mechanisms, such as the effective application of democratic clauses within organizations like the OAS or Mercosur. However, he emphasizes that the region shows a clear deficit in applying these instruments, which left Venezuela without a regional solution and led to a more severe outcome. Even so, he acknowledges that a climate of moderate hope is perceived in Venezuela today, associated with the possibility of a clearer transition, albeit inevitably marked by U.S. supremacy.
According to Molina, Venezuela’s recovery of international legitimacy depends first and foremost on the formation of a legitimate government, which goes beyond merely holding elections and requires a transparent, clean, agreed-upon electoral process with broad guarantees, inclusive of ideologically representative candidates—including Chavismo—and clear rules that restore credibility to the democratic system.
Regarding the role of the international community, Molina argues that it has largely been a spectator to the Venezuelan crisis. While there were statements and declarations, these were partial and rhetorical. He believes the emerging scenario points toward a negotiated and orderly transition, more electoral than chaotic, though not in the short term. He notes that the United States has explicitly proposed a phased roadmap—pacification, stabilization, and transition—implying that if Venezuelans do not define the transition themselves, it will be heavily tutored by Washington.
On possible international scenarios, Molina describes the current process as a timid transition, in which the political system remains largely intact but under U.S. supervision. In the short term, he foresees an absolute priority on the energy and oil agenda, with institutional and bilateral realignment with the United States that could imply a “re-Americanization” of the oil industry. In the medium term, he does not anticipate major changes, and in the long term he conditions any deep transformation on the holding of elections with real guarantees.
Geopolitically, Molina argues that the world is undergoing a tripolarization among the United States, China, and Russia. He interprets the operation in Venezuela as a strategic move by the United States to reaffirm its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, in a context of fragmented and weakened Latin American regionalism. He notes that there is currently no cohesive regional opposition to Washington, due to the multiple commercial and strategic interests Latin American countries maintain with the United States.
From this perspective, he considers Latin American integration to be deeply weakened. He describes the region as experiencing “fragmented regionalism,” with integration mechanisms that are paralyzed, politicized, or hollowed out, limiting collective action in the face of crises such as Venezuela’s.
Regarding Venezuela’s regional reintegration, Molina argues that it will be primarily shaped by the energy factor and the relationship with the United States, relegating China and Russia to secondary roles. Reintegration will depend less on regional organizations—currently weakened—and more on the geopolitical and economic alignment configured under U.S. tutelage.
Finally, from the standpoint of international law, Molina argues that the principle of last resort was not respected before advancing toward an extreme measure such as the capture of a head of state. He states that fundamental mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes—negotiation, mediation, arbitration—enshrined in the UN Charter were discarded. In terms of legality and due process, he warns that acting outside international law weakens norms regulating the use of force, undermines sovereignty, and raises dangerous questions about the handling of international crimes such as drug trafficking and terrorism.
Economy and recovery
The partial easing of sanctions by the U.S. government aims to reactivate Venezuelan oil trade with U.S. companies as part of a normalization process. Economic historian Pedro Benítez argues that the Venezuelan state lacks the financial and operational capacity to manage the oil industry, as it is effectively bankrupt. He notes that external debt as a share of GDP stands between 160% and 200%, making it unviable for the state to incur new debt to recover the oil sector when there are immediate social emergencies such as health, education, and public-sector wages, which are currently among the lowest in Latin America.
Benítez argues that following the economic collapse, virtually all sectors of the Venezuelan economy present recovery opportunities in the short, medium, and long term. In the short term, he highlights commerce, services, and agriculture, which require lower investment and have faster maturation cycles. He believes that major long-term investments will come once political stability is achieved, a view also shared by executives in the international oil sector.
In the energy sector, he recognizes a recovery opportunity but clarifies that its structural effects will take longer. He cites the case of Chevron in 2023, when the company expanded its operations in Venezuela to extract crude oil and export it to the United States, helping finance imports and partially stabilize the currency, accounting for a significant share of the country’s oil revenues.
Benítez points out that the country’s infrastructure is severely deteriorated, particularly the electricity system, which was nationalized and centralized during Hugo Chávez’s government. The main pillar is the Simón Bolívar Hydroelectric Plant (Guri), which supplies more than 70% of national electricity, making the system highly vulnerable to prolonged droughts, while the thermoelectric sector—essential as backup—has also deteriorated.
Nearly a month after Maduro’s capture by the U.S. military, Benítez distinguishes between what the country needs to do and what those in power are actually capable of doing. He argues that the economic model promoted by Chávez was the main cause of the crisis, and that Maduro’s own government began partially dismantling it between 2018 and 2019 by eliminating currency controls, liberalizing imports, and lifting price controls. This improved supply conditions but not real wages or purchasing power.
At the macroeconomic level, Benítez recalls that between 2013 and the 2020 pandemic, Venezuela lost between 70% and 80% of its GDP, representing the largest destruction of wealth ever recorded in a country not at war and explaining the emigration of nearly a quarter of the population. As a result, he maintains that recovery will necessarily be slow, although any improvement is significant given the scale of the collapse.
In this context, Venezuela continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis, with deteriorated public services, a ruined oil industry, and an exhausted population. Benitez also stresses the absence of transparent public budgets, the lack of accountability by the Central Bank, and arbitrary fiscal and monetary management.
Despite these limitations, the Venezuelan Parliament approved a new hydrocarbons law allowing greater private participation in the oil sector under state supervision, aimed at attracting investment and revitalizing activity. This is key given that Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves—estimated at around 303.8 billion barrels—yet this wealth has not translated into effective production or sustainable income. Indeed, crude oil production fell from over 3.5 million barrels per day in the 1990s to around 900,000 barrels per day in 2024, due to years of mismanagement, infrastructure deterioration, and international sanctions. While U.S. sanctions deepened the crisis, the industry already faced serious problems prior to their implementation.
In this reality, Benítez describes a scenario of high uncertainty, but with expectations that can shift rapidly. He notes that before the recent military operation and announcements of oil negotiations with the United States, the country was on the verge of renewed hyperinflation, with annual inflation estimated between 500% and 600% for 2025 and a wide exchange-rate gap. Following these announcements, the parallel dollar dropped sharply, illustrating the immediate impact of expectations on the Venezuelan economy.
In this sense, he argues that the restoration of economic relations with the United States and the eventual lifting of sanctions improve prospects, though he warns that severe fiscal and monetary imbalances persist. He concludes that there is a window of opportunity, but its exploitation will depend on political capacity to implement structural reforms.
Finally, regarding the current political scenario, Benítez states that it is unclear whether the government led by Delcy Rodríguez has the political and administrative capacity to implement deep reforms. He believes Venezuela must complete a democratic transition to consolidate a legitimate government capable of applying a comprehensive economic program. In conclusion, the current situation combines a complex political transition, legal changes in the oil industry, geopolitical tensions, and structural economic challenges that will be decisive for the country’s future. Recovery, he concludes, will depend on both internal and external factors: democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, investment, and regional cooperation networks.
As Benitez points out, the social climate can be defined as a form of „contained hope“: a cautious expectation of change, marked by the relief at the end of Maduro’s leadership, but also by the persistence of repressive practises, the continuity of Chavismo figures in power and the weakness of the traditional opposition generate distrust about the possibility of a lasting democratic and sovereign transformation.
This analysis allows us to affirm that the country is going through a transition that appears to be inevitable, although clearly protected. Far from constituting a full break with Chavismo, the process takes place under strong supervision by the United States, which calls into question the possibility of effective sovereignty and limits the internal margins of action of the new government. In this sense, the intervention not only exposes the depth of the Venezuelan crisis, but also the fragility of international law in the face of unilateral decisions of the great powers.
In economic terms, Venezuela went from being one of the most relevant economies of the continent – and the main oil exporter – to exhibit dimensions comparable to those of Central American countries, with severe fiscal and monetary imbalances, a collapsed infrastructure and an exhausted population. However, the possible “re-Americanisation” of the oil industry reinforces the idea of a subordinate transition, where economic recovery depends on both political stabilisation and geopolitical alignment.
In summary, the relaxation of sanctions and the positive reaction of economic expectations configure a window of opportunity. Its use emerges as the structuring axis of the entire process and will depend on the political capacity to implement profound structural reforms, whose viability remains uncertain given the current institutional conditions.